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Abstract
Adequately funding occupational pension funds is a major concern for society in general
and individual contributors in particular. The low returns accompanied with high volatility
in capital markets have put many funds in distress. While the basic contributions are
mostly defined by the state, the fund’s situation may require additional contributions from
the insureds or may allow the distribution of surpluses. In this paper, we focus on the
accumulation phase of a defined contribution plan in Switzerland with minimum returns
and annual solvency targets in terms of an assets-to-liabilities funding ratio. From the
viewpoint of the pension fund, we evaluate the outcome of selected funding mechanisms on
the solvency situation. Taking the perspective of the contributors, we analyze the payoff
and the utility. Combining both prospects, we discuss the boundary values that trigger the
various participation mechanisms and their impact. We find that remediation measures,
while stabilizing the fund, yield a higher volatility in the insureds contributions. Further,
surplus distributions lower the relative payoff utility of the funds members and increase the
frequency of remediation measures. Overall, insureds and pension funds will profit from a
cautious surplus distribution policy that focuses on keeping the stability high and lowers
the volatility of the result.
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the Swiss pension system and occupational pension funds (2nd pillar)
in particular, the demographic and capital market framework conditions have changed. Life
expectancy is increasing, while birthrate is decreasing, causing the ratio of the number of active
workers to the number of retirees to decline over the years (see OECD, 2015b). In the finan-
cial markets, many asset classes have delivered historically low returns and at the same time
exhibited increased volatility in the last two decades (see OECD, 2015a).
The demographic issues and changing capital markets from the last financial crisis and ongoing
turbulences are highlighted by most practitioners (see Credit Suisse, 2014). There are also
other factors that change the environment. For example, at the society level, family and living
structures along with work conditions have changed (see, e.g., Maas et al., 2015). Flexibility
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in work time management, statutory and effective retirement age and new disability and old-
age dependency challenges need to be considered. Many technical parameters in Swiss pension
funds (e.g., the minimum interest rate, the conversion rate) and their adaptations depend on
political decisions. Reforms have been strongly rejected in the last few years, and the definitions
of technical and actuarial parameters have undergone lengthy political processes. The currently
planned reform in Switzerland called “Altersvorsorge 2020”1 only yields partial answers. In
the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, the solvency of many pension funds has been stressed.
The funding ratio has dropped below 100% in many cases, which has put pressure on funds
to move towards consolidation and sustainability considerations (see Swisscanto, 2015). This
pressure comes along with operational risks with regard to compliance, higher transparency and
governance requirements. Furthermore, one has to consider increasing wealth transfers between
younger and older contributor groups (Avanzi and Purcal, 2014; Eling, 2012) or potentially
unfair mechanisms regarding employees who change their employer and pension fund.2 These
changes pose challenges to the Swiss system and the ones in other countries. Many aspects
of these problems have been discussed by practitioners and politicians, but they have been
given much less attention in academic research. For example, pension funds in good shape have
started paying bonuses to their policyholders while it is unclear whether this is optimal and
increases their utility (see, e.g. Jacquemart, 2014; Lisse, 2014). Independent research and a
solid academic foundation are important in an area where the stakeholders, contributors, pension
funds, actors from the industry and politicians have diverging interests and opinions. This is
why we focus on the following research question: What is the impact of funding mechanisms
on the pension fund stability and the utility of the insured?
While our research holds true for the accumulation of funds in pension funds in many coun-
tries (with certain adaptations), we apply our modeling to the Swiss 2nd pillar pension system
and study different dimensions of risk that affect pension schemes and their members. We study
the impact that remediation measures and surplus distribution have on the stability and the
payoff of a fund and the utility of its members. For this, we put the available funds at the term
of the savings phase in relation to the total payments, i.e. regular contributions and remedia-
tion costs. Our research involves, among others, the adequate choice of parameters, the model’s
sensitivity and the impact of capital market scenarios. While this is adequate when analyzing
the pension fund for the active insureds during the accumulation phase, limitations for drawing
conclusions on the overall state of the fund exist (e.g., exclusion of the bonuses legally due to
pensioners, credits and debits from mortality).
The academic literature analyzing different types of pension schemes is abundant. Sharpe (1976)
is one of the first to rigorously analyze pension insurance provided by a sponsor. Black (1976)
discusses both the optimal pattern of contributions and the optimal investment policy for the
assets of a pension fund. Typically, stochastic pension fund modeling is used, as can be found
in, e.g., O’Brien (1986), Bacinello (1988) and Dufresne (1989). The topic of asset allocation
is studied from different perspectives in the literature as well. By using a simple stochastic
model, Cairns et al. (2006) incorporate asset, salary and interest rate risk in the derivation of
optimal investment strategies. While many actuarial papers analyze risk from demographic
1See http://www.bsv.admin.ch/altersvorsorge_2020, September 2016.
2Contributors changing their employer must change to the pension linked to the new company. Thereby, the
assets are transferred whereas, e.g. potential remediation measures to improve the overall state of the pension
fund, remain with the previous institution. Exceptions may apply, though, in the case of partial liquidation of
the fund (see BVG, Art. 53).
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changes, financial risk in pension funds is less extensively considered in the existing liter-
ature: Most recently, by integrating assets and liabilities as well as solvency requirements,
Berdin and Gru¨ndl (2015) consider a representative German life insurer and its asset allo-
cation and outstanding liabilities. Generating a stochastic term structure of interest rates
and stock market returns, the authors simulate investment returns in a multi-period setting.
Based on empirically calibrated parameters, the evolution of the balance sheet is observed
with a special focus on the solvency situation. Looking at participating life insurance con-
tracts, Schmeiser and Wagner (2014) try to find a suitable value for the guaranteed interest
rate. Their results show that as the risk-free interest rate approaches the guaranteed one, the
equity falls to zero, as there is no longer any benefit from risky investments. This is relevant
for pension funds too, as a minimum interest rate must be credited annually to the accounts of
the contributors (see Broeders et al., 2011; Mirza and Wagner, 2016). A study of the impact
of product features and contributor types on lapse in life insurance contracts can be found in
Eling and Kiesenbauer (2013). Using a data set from a German life insurer, they conclude that
the contract age and the premium type have the most important impact on the lapse rate. An
analysis of the relationship between the liability structure and the asset allocation of defined ben-
efit pension funds is performed by Alestalo and Puttonen (2006). Examining data from Finnish
pension funds, the authors find that the liability structure does indeed influence the asset allo-
cation, with the age structure of the members being one source of correlation. Examining data
from different countries, Ghilarducci (2010) finds that there is a positive correlation between the
spending for pensions and education. By combining a stochastic pension fund model with a traf-
fic light approach, Braun et al. (2011) measure the shortfall probability of Swiss occupational
pension funds in order to assist stakeholders in making decisions. Examining Dutch pension
funds, Broeders et al. (2016) find empirical evidence for herding behavior in the asset alloca-
tion of institutions. By analyzing the optimality of supervisory rules, Chen and Clever (2015)
show that both the security mechanisms and risk measures used by regulators influence the
optimality of the regulations. The optimality of the boundaries used for the objective funding
ratio and the optimal dividends are also discussed by Gerber and Shiu (2003). Finally, in a
recent working paper, and closest to our undertaking, Avanzi et al. (2016) formally analyze the
iteration of surplus dividend payments and the funding ratio of pension funds.
Recent statistical and industrial publications in Switzerland consider the current state of pen-
sion funds from a practical point of view. Often, they focus on the ongoing reforms, underline
challenges that the system is facing, and discuss relevant funding ratios or intergenerational
wealth transfers. An overview of the situation can be found in Albrecher et al. (2016). Some
authors analyze the financial situation of funds, discuss possible reforms and ways to go for-
ward (Bischofberger and Walser, 2011). Eling (2012) considers the current wealth distribution
and transfer mechanisms among young and old generations in Switzerland. The aging popula-
tion and the long-term (financial) perspectives are also in the focus of UBS (2014). In his recent
book, Cosandey (2014) discusses reforms for fair intergenerational mechanisms and justice.
Our research aims at building on and extending the current state of knowledge by considering the
framework of private Swiss pension funds, accounting for the currently changing environmental
conditions, and including both the asset and liability perspectives. Using stochastic simulations
and considering an individual contributor’s account, we construct a model to assess the extra
contribution and the surplus distribution mechanisms of defined contribution pension plans.
From the institutional perspective, the funding ratio and the stability of the fund are taken
into consideration. In particular, we look at the changes in the funding ratio over time for
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different funding mechanisms. This includes limits for the distribution of bonuses and methods
for determining the additional contributions. We analyze what leads to greater stability of
the fund and to higher final contributor utility. We study several scenarios for the capital
market returns in order to examine the fund’s ability to cope with periods of low and high
market returns. We obtain the distribution of the final payoff and its sensitivity to the different
mechanisms.
Our results indicate that the distribution of bonuses is connected to a higher volatility of the
account value at retirement. For risk averse individuals, this leads to a decrease of their relative
certainty equivalent. Thus, from a policyholder perspective, it is typically favorable not to get
surpluses credited to the account during the contract period. With respect to pension fund
policies, we believe that funds should consider measures that help reducing the volatility in the
outcomes (e.g. by distributing less, less often, or accumulating larger reserves before doing so).
From this increased stability, the insured as well as the fund would be able to profit. More
specifically, our main findings are as follows. First, it is deduced that charging remediation
measures helps secure the stability of the fund in years following low market returns. Funds
in good health can distribute bonuses to their clients while still maintaining their good state.
However, this may be detrimental to the utility of the insured since remediation measures may
be required afterwards. For these methods to be fully effective, the right choice of parameters
is crucial, as our sensitivity analysis shows. Long-lasting periods of low returns have a strong
impact on the fund because remediation and bonus measures influence the contributor’s payoff.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces the model
framework and explains the processes that take place. The implementation and choice of pa-
rameters are given in the third part. Section 4 covers the numerical analysis. This includes
several funding mechanisms and a sensitivity analysis of the results. Additionally, the accounts
of the insured at interim time points and capital market scenarios are studied. The final section
discusses the results and concludes.
2 Model Framework
To properly control for actuarial gains and losses over time, a scenario-based stochastic approach
seems natural. By performing numerical simulations, we examine how the accounts of members
evolve over time. For this, we look at an individual model contributor in a multi-period setting
and take the simplified balance sheet approach comparable to that in Eling and Holder (2013)
or Broeders et al. (2011), which is depicted in Figure 1.
Assets Liabilities
Assets At
Remediation measures Kt
Accumulated Contributions Ct
Bonuses Bt
Figure 1: Simplified balance sheet in time t.
The annual contributions of an individual insured in time periods t = 0, . . . , T increase the
pension assets (At) and lead to a liability changing over time (cf. Figure 2) linked directly
to the contributions (Ct). Additional contributions (cf. remediation measures Kt introduced
below) are accounted to the asset side while bonus payments (Bt) account for the liabilities. We
model a pension fund by simulating the assets of the fund limited to an individual contributor.
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The assets follow a stochastic process for the rates of return at time t. The liabilities evolve
according to the legally fixed minimum interest rate rPL.
For every year that has passed, the fund compares how assets and liabilities relate to each other.
This involves looking at the funding ratio Ft = (At +Kt) / (Ct +Bt) (Equation 8), which is the
key regulatory measure for Swiss pension funds (BVV2, Art. 44). Depending on Ft being higher
or lower than some predefined threshold, actions are modeled along predefined mechanisms (cf.
Sections 2.2 and 3.3).
Time Period t+ 1
Contributions
Assets
Add. contrib.
Bonus
Liabilities
Funding ratio
Ct
At
Kt
Bt
Lt
Ft
0 +
Ct
At
Kt
Bt
Lt
Ft
− t +
Ct+1
At+1
Kt+1
Bt+1
Lt+1
Ft+1
−(t + 1)+
CT
AT
KT
BT
LT
FT
− T
Ct+
+ct+1 ·erPL
At+
+ct+1 ·ert+1
Kt+
+kt+1 ·ert+1
B(t+1)−
·erPL +bt+1
Lt+
+ct+1 ·erPL
L(t+1)−
+bt+1
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
Figure 2: Illustration of the contract variables and the cash flows during the saving period
along the contract timeline from time t = 0 until T . In our model t+ denotes the beginning
of period t + 1 and (t + 1)− the end of it. Contributions are credited at the beginning of the
period (t+) just after the calculation of the funding ratio in t. Bonus payments are granted
in (t + 1)− and thereafter the end-of-period funding ratio is evaluated (time t + 1). For the
description of the variables see Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
2.1 Contributions, Asset Evolution and Funding Ratio
We consider an active insured at age x contributing during its working time. The time horizon
covers the T periods, i.e., times t = 0, . . . , T . Adjustments of the key variables occur at the
beginning and end of a period, i.e., in t+ and (t + 1)−.
Basic Contributions The annual contributions ct depend on the salary and conversion fac-
tors linked to the age of the insured. From the salary St+1 in period t+1, the coordinated period
salary Sˆt+1 is calculated by subtracting the coordination deduction S
cd
t . Only the part between
a minimum value Sˆmint and a maximum Sˆ
max
t falls under the legal minimum rates (BVG, Art. 8).
The coordinated salary in period t+ 1, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, is
Sˆt+1 = min
{
max
{
St+1 − S
cd
t ; Sˆ
min
t
}
; Sˆmaxt
}
. (1)
The contribution ct+1 is determined by multiplication of the coordinated salary Sˆt+1 with a
contribution rate fSx,t, depending on the age x and the time t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (BVG, Art. 16),
i.e.,
ct+1 = f
S
x,t · Sˆt+1. (2)
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Contributions are assumed to be paid at the beginning of each period, i.e., for period t + 1,
the contribution ct+1 is paid at time t
+. While in practice the payment of ct+1 is split up
between employees and employers, we do not distinguish the origin of the contributions in
our model. The policyholder is assumed to be concerned by the total account value (see also
Section 2.3). During every period, the member receives a minimum interest rate rPL on the
sum of its contributions Ct. The value at time t+ 1 is
Ct+1 = (Ct + ct+1) · e
rPL , (3)
with C0 = 0.
Asset Evolution The assets At represent the funds that are available for paying the liabilities
towards the members. They consist of the paid contributions and the returns from investing
them. As for Ct, ct+1 is added to the assets at the beginning of each period, i.e.,
At+ = At + ct+1, (4)
with A0 = 0. The fund must be self-financing with the contributions and capital market
earnings. To simulate the return from the capital market, a basic stock model is applied. We
use a geometric Brownian motion with drift µB and volatility σB, i.e.,
dAt = µBAtdt + σBAtdWt, (5)
where W = (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion (Bjo¨rk, 2004). The return in period t + 1,
then, is
rt+1 = ln
[
At+1
A+t
]
= µB −
σ2B
2
+ σB ·N0,1, (6)
with N0,1 a standard normally distributed random variable. At the end of the period, the
assets At+1 are
At+1 = At+ · e
rt+1 = (At + ct+1) · e
rt+1 . (7)
Funding Ratio The funding ratio is determined by dividing the total assets, i.e., equity and
additional contributions over the liabilities. Additional contributions may be due in case of
periods with underfunding (cf. Section 2.2). The funding ratio therefore is
Ft+1 =
At+1 +Kt+1
Lt+1
=
At+1 +Kt+1
Ct+1 +Bt+1
, (8)
where the liabilities Lt+1 equal the contributions Ct+1 and surpluses Bt+1. Bonuses are dis-
tributed when the fund is in good health (cf. Section 2.2.2).
The funding ratio is calculated at the end of period t+ 1. Depending on its value, it is decided
whether bonuses can be distributed or whether additional contributions need to be charged. A
value below 100% corresponds to underfunding, while Ft+1 > 100% means overfunding.
2.2 Monitoring of the Funding Ratio and Funding Mechanisms
When the funding ratio exceeds a certain threshold, the surpluses can be distributed to the
members. In the case of underfunding, remediation measures may be necessary. The concept
of using boundaries for the funding ratio, that we apply therein, has been discussed earlier by,
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e.g., Gerber and Shiu (2003). In the following, the corresponding mechanisms, that are used in
our analysis, are explained.3
2.2.1 Situation of Underfunding and Additional Contributions
We consider a procedure that automatically determines recovery contributions. In practice
this is not an automated process. The board of the fund evaluates the underfunding with
consideration of the fund’s overall situation (e.g., market environment, investment portfolio,
characteristics of the members). If recovery measures have been decided upon, the employers
of the insured may also be involved in covering deficits (BVG, Art. 65d).
Once Ft drops below 100%, the assets do not suffice to meet the obligations. Therefore, the
insured may be requested to pay additional contributions. Additional contributions are paid
at the beginning of the following year. We present two methods for calculating the additional
contributions kt+1 in period t+ 1.
Our first method (UF1) is based on a share z of the funding gap Lt − (At +Kt). This comes
into action once the funding ratio drops below a limit Fmin. Additional contributions at time t
+
then are
kt+1 = z · (Lt − (At +Kt)) , (9)
where z represents the share of Lt − (At +Kt) to be paid.
The second method (UF2) is based on a Value-at-Risk approach.4 Here, kt+1 is set such that
at the end of the next period, the funding ratio falls below 100% only with probability q. The
probability q is typically a small number. In the Solvency II regulation for private insurances, for
example, q is set to 0.5%. In our sensitivity analyses, we use a 1% to 10% one-year underfunding
probability threshold (see Table 3). In our model, realizations of the funding ratio are evaluated
through
Fˆt+1 (kt+1) =
(At + ct+1) · e
rt+1 + (Kt + kt+1) · e
rt+1
(Lt + ct+1) · erPL
, (10)
where rt+1 is a realization of the asset return in the following period. Thus, additional contri-
butions kt+1 must fulfill the equation
V aR1−q
(
1− Fˆt+1
)
= inf
{
x
∣∣∣P(Fˆt+1 (kt+1) < 100% − x
)
≤ q
}
!
= 0, (11)
3In contrast to life insurance companies, regulations such as Solvency II and the Swiss Solvency Test (SST)
do not apply to Swiss pension funds. The reason why a transfer of these regulations has not been performed
yet can be found in the differences between funds and insurers. In contrast to insurance companies, gains
and losses are distributed among the members. Additionally, the contractual relationship between the policy-
holder and the pension fund is quite rigid.For example, employees are automatically affiliated in the pension
plan connected to the employer. Due to these characteristics, a temporary phase of underfunding can be dealt
with. Pension funds stay in business and pursue their investment strategies even when they are underfunded.
Also, it is the decision of the board of the fund if, and to what extent, remediation measures and surplus
payments are to be made. This stands in strong contrast to life insurance companies regulated by market au-
thorities that require strict solvency calculations and adequate capitalization on a year-to-year basis. While
there have been efforts to suggest regulations comparable to Solvency II and the SST for pension funds (see, e.g.
Schweizerische Kammer der Pensionskassen-Experten, 2012; Braun et al., 2011), there are currently no regula-
tions with respect to this.
4Note that in practice, the use of method (UF1) is more common among Swiss pension funds. Furthermore,
it is the board of the fund that ultimately decides on when charging remediation measures as well as on their
amount.
7
Pension Funding Mechanisms: Stability and Payoff
with
!
= denoting that the Value-at-Risk has to be equal to zero. Thus, the equation
inf
{
x
∣∣∣∣P
(
(At + ct+1) · e
rt+1 + (Kt + kt+1) · e
rt+1
(Lt + ct+1) · erPL
< 100% − x
)
≤ q
}
= 0 (12)
needs to be solved numerically for kt+1.
5 The intuition behind this is that higher additional
contributions kt+1 increase the funding ratio and decrease the ruin probability, i.e., the proba-
bility that the funding ratio falls below 100% in the next period. We therefore aim to find the
smallest value for kt+1 for which the probability that the funding ratio falls below 100% (x
!
= 0)
is smaller or equal to a small value q. The contributions kt+1 are added to the assets, but
not to the account of the insured. Because Kt is invested on the capital market, the return in
period t+ 1 is rt+1. We have
Kt+1 = Kt+ · e
rt+1 = (Kt + kt+1) · e
rt+1 . (13)
2.2.2 Situation of Overfunding and Surplus Distribution
In years where market returns exceed rPL, the assets of the pension fund grow. Part of the
surplus can be distributed to the members (BVG, Art. 68a). Additionally, it is required that
the fund holds a reserve in case of fluctuation of the assets (BVV2, Art. 48e). Therefore, we
assume for our base scenario (see, e.g., the cases shaded in gray in our sensitivity analysis,
Table 3) that surpluses can only be distributed once a certain reserve on the liabilities has been
accumulated (see the definition of the parameters in Table 1 and Footnote 11 in Section 3.3).
We assume that a bonus bt+1 is paid out at the end of a period if F(t+1)− exceeds a limit F
L
t+1.
6
Because it represents an obligation, the sum of surpluses Bt+1 is part of the liabilities. Such
payments cause a drop of the funding ratio. We assume that bt+1 is chosen such that from the
threshold FLt+1, the decrease equals ∆Ft+1. Subsequently, bt+1 is derived from
Ft+1 =
At+1 +Kt+1
Ct+1 +B(t+1)− + bt+1
!
= FLt+1 −∆Ft+1. (14)
The bonuses Bt grow with the rate rPL and their value at time t+ 1 is
Bt+1 = B(t+1)− + bt+1 = Bt · e
rPL + bt+1. (15)
While in our model Bt increases with a rate of rPL, this is not required in practice, as bonuses
do not fall under the legal minimum (see, e.g., Avanzi and Purcal (2014)). In the above, we
assume that surpluses are paid out as a lump sum. In practice, it is more common to assign
bonuses as increased interest rates on the insured’s account. The methods can be converted
into each other, i.e.,
Lt+1 = (Lt + ct+1) · e
rPL + bt+1 ≡ (Lt + ct+1) · e
rPL+rb = (Lt + ct+1) · e
reff , (16)
with
reff = rPL + rb ≥ rPL. (17)
In our discussion, we focus on the lump sum payments.
5For solving Equation 12, we use a numerical root-finding algorithm. A reliable and quick method is, e.g., the
method proposed by Brent (1974).
6This can be compared with the dividend distribution analyzed in Avanzi et al. (2016).
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2.3 Contributor Valuation
To evaluate the payoff and utility of the members, we use several indicators. To assess the
contributor’s return on its contributions, we use the internal rate of return rc+b+k defined as
follows: If the insured were only to receive the return rc+b+k on its regular contributions, the
account value would equal the value of contributions and bonuses minus remediation measures
at time T , i.e.,
T∑
t=1
ct · e
rc+b+k·(T−t+1) != CT +BT −KT . (18)
To measure the utility, we use the certainty equivalent u−1 (E [u (LT )]). For this, we use a
constant relative risk aversion utility as introduced, e.g., in Broeders et al. (2011),
u(x) =
x1−ρ
1− ρ
, with ρ > 0, ρ 6= 1. (19)
In order to take the amounts paid in the various cases (regular contributions and irregular
remediation measures) into account in our analysis, we focus on the relative certainty equivalent
given by
u−1 (E [u (LT )])
CT + E [KT ]
. (20)
3 Implementation and Parameterization
To simulate the course of the assets we use Monte Carlo simulations. Results are obtained
using N = 100 000 realizations in every period. We first introduce a reference case setting
with the starting values for the various model parameters. The parameters are summarized
in Table 1 and described in the following.
3.1 Legislation
We consider one type of insured working from age 25 until retirement at 65, corresponding
to T = 40 working years. Their salary starts at CHF 55 000 (first period) and grows linearly
to CHF 82 300 (present value), corresponding to the Swiss average at time zero. Additionally,
the salary grows with a rate of rS = 1% per year in order to reflect the increase of salaries
related to the increase of prices.7 The pension fund contributions are set by the legislator. The
coordination deduction Scd0 for 2016 is CHF 24 675. The minimum and maximum coordinated
salaries Sˆmin0 and Sˆ
max
0 are CHF 3525 and CHF 59 925 (BVV2, Art. 5). They are adapted over
time with the rate rS. The contribution factor f
S
x,t changes with the age of the contributor. We
consider total contributions, i.e. the factors correspond to the contributions by employers and
employees.8 Since the salary St and the contribution rates f
S
x,t grow with age and time, ct is
higher in later years. For 2016, the minimum interest rate rPL is 1.25% (BVV2, Art. 12). We
first use this as a constant value as we do for the distribution of the capital market returns,
since the general interest environment remains unchanged. When studying the capital market
scenarios in Section 4.4, we allow for variations in rPL, though (see also Footnote 12). For the
risk-free interest rate rf, a value of 1% is chosen. This is related to rS, the increase in prices.
7This corresponds to the historical salary changes also found in the adaptations of the BVV2 salary boundaries.
8In our analysis, we do not differentiate between the sources of the contributions, but we focus on the total
payoff at time T .
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Parameter Variable Value
Number of periods T 40
Legislation
Coordination deduction (at time t = 0) Scd0 CHF 24 675
Minimum coordinated salary (t = 0) Sˆmin0 CHF 3 525
Maximum coordinated salary (t = 0) Sˆmax0 CHF 59 925
Total contribution rate of age class 25 – 34 fSx,t 7%
Total contribution rate of age class 35 – 44 fSx,t 10%
Total contribution rate of age class 45 – 54 fSx,t 15%
Total contribution rate of age class 55 – 65 fSx,t 18%
Salary growth rate rS 1%
Minimum interest rate rPL 1.25%
Risk-free interest rate rf 1%
Capital market
Drift of the geometric Brownian motion process µB 3.0%
Volatility of the geometric Brownian motion process σB 6.0%
Pension fund governance
Minimum funding ratio Fmin 100%
Proportion of missing assets to be paid z 90%
Quantile for additional contributions q 1%
Upper bound for distributing surpluses FLt+1 ≡ F
L 110%
Difference of bonus bounds ∆Ft+1 ≡ ∆F 2%
Policyholder utility
Risk aversion ρ 30
Table 1: Input parameters for the reference case.
It follows that
∑40
t=1 ct/
∑40
t=1 Sˆt is constant and equals 13.71%. When no bonuses are paid, a
fixed value for rPL leads to constant liabilities at retirement, i.e. L40 = 361 212.
3.2 Capital Market
To calibrate the parameters of the asset process, the LPP-40 sub-index of the Pictet LPP 2000
index is utilized. With an equity portion of 40%, this index is close to the average investments
of larger pension funds in Switzerland. It also contains approximately 40% of foreign currency
investments.9 We parametrize a geometric Brownian motion based on the annualized average
monthly performance from January 2000 to December 2015, i.e., we calculate the index perfor-
mance using monthly data and choose the (rounded) annualized values of µB = 3% for the drift
and σB = 6% for the volatility.
10
9The composition of the index is 60% bonds and 40% equities, with about 40% of the investments made in
foreign currencies. For further information, see https://www.group.pictet/corporate/en/home/institutiona
l_investors/lpp_indices/lpp2000.html, September 2016.
10We chose to use annualized values based on the monthly observations to have a larger statistical basis (192
observations). The annualized expected return is calculated from the monthly expected return by multiplying
by 12. The corresponding volatility is obtained from multiplication by
√
12. For comparison, when calculating the
performance on the base of the only 16 annual data points, we find that the expected return remains unchanged
and yields 3% while the volatility is about 2% higher in the considered period.
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3.3 Pension Fund Governance and Policyholder Utility
If Ft falls below Fmin, the fund can ask for remediation measures. In the reference case, we use
a lower limit of Fmin = 100% (legal minimum). For our first method, a proportion z = 90%
of Lt −At is used. The purpose of this is to reduce the one-time capital outlay for the policy-
holders and spread the remediation expenses over a longer time. The second method is based on
a Value-at-Risk approach. The additional payment kt is set such that in the following period,
the fund is underfunded with a probability of q = 1%. Once the funding ratio exceeds FLt+1,
a bonus can be distributed. We use a constant upper limit of FLt+1 ≡ F
L = 110%11 and as-
sume that surpluses are distributed until the funding ratio has decreased to FL −∆F = 108%,
corresponding to ∆Ft+1 ≡ ∆F = 2%. In the policyholder utility, we use a risk aversion factor
of ρ = 30.
4 Numerical Analysis and Discussion
4.1 Funding Mechanisms: Impact over Time
We assess the impact of remediation measures and surplus distributions by analyzing Ft, kt
and bt for
• case (A), with neither additional contributions nor surplus distribution,
• case (B), with only additional contributions, and
• case (C), with both remediation measures and surplus distribution.
The additional contributions are calculated along method (UF1). The parameters are as in Ta-
ble 1.
Funding Ratios and Remediation Measures In Figure 3, the 1%, 50% and 99% quantiles
of Ft are given for the cases (A) and (B). In Figure 3(a) (case A), the 1% quantile of Ft al-
ways stays below 100%. It starts at approximately 90% and subsequently drops to about 80%.
The 50% quantile q50%(Ft) starts at almost 100% and grows to about 130% in t = 40. This
drift is related to the difference between µB and rPL. In case (B), in Figure 3(b), the addi-
tional contributions only affect the 1% quantile, now reaching almost 100% in T . Remediation
measures lead to an improvement of underfunding situations, while the other quantiles remain
unchanged. The 99% quantile grows from nearly 120% to 220% making the distribution of
surpluses possible.
Expected Remediation Measures For case (B), Figure 4 shows the development of kt
and Kt. Figure 4(a) shows the expected present value of kt and the 99% quantile. The 99%
quantile of the additional contributions grows and reach more than CHF 10 000 at time T . The
present expected value stays close to zero. As in Figure 3, the fund is always overfunded in the
upper 50% of all cases.
For the present value of Kt (see Figure 4(b)), we observe that the 99% quantile reaches
about CHF 50 000. The shape of the q99%
(
Kt · e
−(t−1)rf
)
curve follows from the additional
11In our base case, bonuses can only be distributed if the funding ratio exceeds 110%, i.e. when reserves of 10%
on top of the value of the liabilities are accumulated. This reference scenario corresponds to the target values
mostly observed in practice (5% to 10%). In our sensitivity analysis, we vary FL = 110% through very low and
high values ranging from 102% to 118% corresponding to reserves of 2% to 18% of the liabilities (see Table 3).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the funding ratio Ft in the cases A (no additional contributions, no
bonus payments) and B (additional contributions, no bonus payments). The graphs depict
the 1%, 50% and 99% quantiles of Ft. The parameters are as in the reference case given
in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the discounted remediation measures kt and their sum Kt in case B (ad-
ditional contributions, no bonus payments). The graphs depict the expected present value and
the 99% quantile of kt and Kt. The parameters are as in the reference case in Table 1.
contributions being credited with the returns rt+1. The expected value exceeds zero (see line 7
in Table 3 from the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.2). The expected remediation measures
discounted to time zero E
[
kt · e
−(t−1)rf |kt > 0
]
amount to CHF 1520. They are levied four
times on average (cf. Table 3). The overall expected payments are approximately CHF 6080.
Surplus Distribution For case (C), Figure 5 depicts the 1%, 50% and 99% quantiles of Ft
from periods 1 to 40. Distributing surpluses leads to the 1% quantile q1%(Ft) being around 90%.
The 99% quantile q99%(Ft) lies at 110%, which equals F
L. The 50% quantile q50%(Ft) starts at
approximately 100% and converges to about 107% (below FL −∆F = 110% − 2% = 108%).
Additional Contributions and Bonus Payments Figure 6 depicts the expected present
value and the 99% quantile of kt and bt. The expected present value of kt exceeds CHF 3000 at
time T , whereas bt reaches approximately CHF 8000. The surpluses that are paid out on average
are thus approximately double of what needs to be paid in remediation cases. A similar conclu-
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Figure 5: Illustration of the funding ratio Ft in case (C) (additional contributions, bonus pay-
ments). The graph depicts the 1%, 50% and 99% quantiles of Ft. The parameters are as in the
reference case given in Table 1.
sion can be drawn for the quantile values where the surpluses of best cases are twice the value of
remediation measures. Due to the drift of the investment process, they increase exponentially.
In T , E
[
kt · e
−(t−1)rf
]
reaches almost CHF 250 while E
[
bt · e
−t rf
]
is about CHF 10 000. This
matches the observations made regarding the funding ratio where q50%(Ft) is around 107%.
With the given bonus bounds, µB = 3% and rPL = 1.25%, the fund is likely to be overfunded,
i.e. bt grows faster than kt. This causes higher volatility in the payout stream, i.e., despite
bonuses in some years, additional contributions need to be made in others (cf. discussion in
Section 4.2).
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Figure 6: Illustration of the discounted extra contributions kt and the bonus payments bt in
case C (additional contributions, bonus payments). The graphs depict the expected present
value as well as the 99% quantile of kt and bt. The parameters are as in the reference case given
in Table 1.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We study key indicators at time T = 40 from the contributor’s and the fund’s perspectives and
analyze how sensitive the results are to parameter changes. In Table 3, the columns labeled 1 to 7
contain the input values, columns 8 to 13 the insured’s perspective, 14 to 19 the funding levels
and 20 to 25 the surplus distribution and the remediation measures. A detailed explanation of
13
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the columns is given in Table 2.
In the first line of Table 3, case (A) with neither remediation measures nor surplus distribu-
tions is analyzed. Rows 2 to 11, show case (B) with additional contributions. This includes
changing Fmin for method (UF1) and q for (UF2). Lines 12 to 32 cover case (C) with remedi-
ation measures and bonus payments. There, FL is altered first. Next, we vary the difference
of bonus bounds ∆F . Subsequently, the parameters Fmin and q are changed as for case (B).
When changing one variable, the others are kept constant (cf. Table 1).
Item Description
1 Case
(A) no additional contributions, no bonus payments, (B)
only additional contributions, (C) additional contributions
and bonus payments (Section 4.1)
2 UF (indicator)
Calculation method for remediation measures: 1 = percent-
age of funding ratio, 2 = Value-at-Risk approach (Section
2.2.1)
3 Fmin Minimum funding ratio targeted (Equation 8)
4 q
Probability for the funding ratio to fall below 100% within
one year (Equation 11)
5 Bonus (indicator)
Use of surplus distribution: 0 = no bonus payments, 1 =
bonus is distributed (Section 2.2.2)
6 FL Upper bound for distributing bonus (Equation 14)
7 ∆F Difference of bonus bounds (Equation 14)
8 E [L40] Expected liabilities in t = 40
9 σ[L40]
E[L40]
Relative volatility of L40
10 γ [L40] Skewness of L40
11 u−1 (E [u (L40)]) Certainty equivalent in t = 40 (Equation 19)
12 u
−1(E[u(L40)])
C40+E[K40]
Relative certainty equivalent in t = 40
13 E [rc+b+k] Internal rate of return (Equation 18)
14 E [Ft] Expected funding ratio
15 E [q1% (Ft)] Expected 1% quantile of the funding ratio
16 E [q50% (Ft)] Expected 50% quantile of the funding ratio
17 E [q99% (Ft)] Expected 99% quantile of the funding ratio
18 q1%
(∑40
t=1 1{Ft<1}
)
1% quantile of the number of years in underfunding
19 q50%
(∑40
t=1 1{Ft>FL}
)
50% quantile of the number of years with Ft exceeding F
L
20
E[
∑40
t=1 kt·e
−(t−1)rf]
∑40
t=1 ct·e
−(t−1)rf
Ratio of the expected present sum of additional contribu-
tions over the sum of present regular contributions
21 E
[∑40
t=1 1{kt>0}
] Expected number of years with remediation measures
required
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22 E
[
kt · e
−(t−1)rf |kt > 0
] Expected present value of remediation measures when re-
quired
23
E[
∑40
t=1 bt·e
−t rf ]
∑40
t=1 ct·e
−(t−1)rf
Ratio of the expected present sum of distributed surpluses
over the sum of present regular contributions
24 E
[∑40
t=1 1{bt>0}
]
Expected number of years with surpluses required
25 E
[
bt · e
−t rf |bt > 0
] Expected present value of distributed surpluses when re-
quired
Table 2: Description of the items in Table 3.
Impact of Minimum Funding Ratio Fmin For case (A), the mean of the effective re-
turn E [rc+b+k] in column 13 (Table 3) equals the minimum interest rate rPL = 1.25%. Intro-
ducing remediation measures according to (UF1) in case (B) leads to higher overall payments.
Since kt is not credited to the liabilities, E [rc+b+k] decreases from 1.16% for a lower boundary
of Fmin equal to 90% down to 1.10% for Fmin = 100%. For the additional contributions, a lower
value for Fmin leads to fewer remediation payments (column 21). The average amount kt paid is
highest for a low value of Fmin and decreases as the boundary is raised (column 22). Column 20
contains the ratio E[
∑40
t=1 kt · e
−(t−1)rf ]/
∑40
t=1 ct · e
−(t−1)rf : lower values of Fmin lead to lower
additional contributions, ranging from 2.6% for Fmin = 100% to 1.5% for Fmin = 90%. While
there are considerable changes in the amount and frequency of additional contributions, E[Ft]
is nearly constant at approximately 1.20.
Value-At-Risk Approach For the Value-at-Risk approach (UF2) in case (B), the sensitiv-
ity is more important. The remediation measures resulting from 1 − q increasing from 90%
up to 99% are higher than for (UF1). Columns 21 and 22 show that additional contribu-
tions are more frequent. The payments remain at a similar level as for high values of Fmin.
The E
[∑40
t=1 kt · e
−(t−1)rf
]
/
∑40
t=1 ct · e
−(t−1)rf ratio goes up to 8%. Due to the increased contri-
butions, Ft increases too. With q decreasing from 10% to 1%, the mean of Ft grows from 1.24
to 1.29.
Impact of the Upper Distribution Limit F L In case (C), significantly higher effective
returns are observed. Changing FL from 102% to 118% leads to fewer bonus payments (col-
umn 24). Since bonuses on average decrease by more than CHF 1000, the ratio of bonuses over
conributions E
[∑40
t=1 bt · e
−t rf
]
/
∑40
t=1 ct · e
−(t−1)rf decreases too. Meanwhile, the amount and
the frequency of additional contributions decrease. For E[rc+b+k], a higher threshold for surplus
distributions leads to a decrease. Overall, E[Ft] rises together with F
L.
Bonus Bounds ∆F As seen in columns 23 to 25, increasing ∆F from 0.01 to 0.06 leads
to a strong increase in average bonuses. While the expected number of payments decreases, a
growth of about 25% take place in E
[∑40
t=1 bt · e
−t rf
]
/
∑40
t=1 ct ·e
−(t−1)rf . Due to larger amounts
being distributed, remediation measures become higher and more frequent. The expected re-
turn E[rc+b+k] and the certainty equivalent u
−1 (E [u (L40)]) increase. While ∆F = 0.01 leads
to a certainty equivalent that equals approximately CHF 420 000, a change to ∆F = 0.06 leads
to an increase in u−1 (E [u (L40)]) of about CHF 14 000.
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Insured Perspective When raising the upper bound for distributing bonuses FL, the cer-
tainty equivalent u−1 (E [u (L40)]) decreases together with E[rc+b+k] by more than 20% (Ta-
ble 3, lines 12 – 16). Insureds should thus prefer lower values of FL, coming along with reg-
ular bonus payments. This is supported by the relative certainty equivalent being the highest
for FL = 102%. Contrary movements follow from varying ∆F . While u−1 (E [u (L40)]) grows
together with it, the relative certainty equivalent (column 12) decreases by approximately 5%.
This is due to higher bonus payments causing an increased need for remediation measures in
years with lower market returns.
In fact, policyholders should prefer that no bonuses are distributed, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 7. In this, the relative certainty equivalent is depicted depending on the difference of bonus
bounds ∆F and the upper boundary for distributing bonuses FL in case C with Fmin = 100%.
The different colors correspond to the values of the relative certainty equivalent u−1 (E [u (L40)]).
In this, darker colors represent a higher relative certainty equivalent and lighter ones a lower
one. As the graph shows, the influence of FL is bigger than that of ∆F as the changes when
moving horizontally on the graph are much larger than the ones when moving vertically. This
is consistent with the results of the sensitivity analysis in Table 3 (lines 12 – 22). Overall,
it can be seen that the relative certainty equivalent is larger for smaller values of the upper
bound FL. Therefore, policyholders should prefer that no bonuses are distributed, as this gives
them the highest relative certainty equivalent. It can thus be said, that the common belief of
clients profiting from surplus distributions is a fallacy. As we can see, the benefit from keeping
additional funds as protection against times with lower capital market returns, is higher than
the one from distributing them to the insureds. Pension funds should therefore put more stress
on accumulating reserves rather than distributing funds to their clients.
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Figure 7: Illustration of the relative certainty equivalent depending on the difference of bonus
bounds ∆F and the upper bound FL for distributing bonuses.
Impact of Remediation Measures on Surpluses Varying Fmin, the changes for the ad-
ditional contributions kt correspond to case (B). With an increasing value for Fmin, additional
payments become lower but more frequent. Consequently, the ratio of additional over reg-
ular contributions E
[∑40
t=1 kt · e
−(t−1)rf
]
/
∑40
t=1 ct · e
−(t−1)rf increases with a higher thresh-
old Fmin inducing an increase in E [L40]. Bonuses are, on average, distributed at approxi-
mately 1.3 more points in time. Together with an increase of E
[
bt · e
−t rf |bt > 0
]
by approx-
imately 2%, E
[∑40
t=1 bt · e
−t rf
]
/
∑40
t=1 ct · e
−(t−1)rf grows by nearly 15% from one extreme to
the other. For the Value-at-Risk approach, we see that for low values of q, both kt and bt grow
16
Pension Funding Mechanisms: Stability and Payoff
considerably. For q = 2.5%, E
[∑40
t=1 bt · e
−t rf
]
/
∑40
t=1 ct · e
−(t−1)rf exceeds 150%. The reme-
diation measures grow similarly, reaching a ratio of approximately 249.1% for q = 1%. This
follows from the additional contributions causing a rise of the funding ratio. Subsequently, Ft
often exceeds FL and the additional contributions are redistributed as bonuses, leading to an
increase in the certainty equivalent of approximately 80%. As the relative certainty equivalent
drops down to almost 70% though, this is unfavorable for insureds.
4.3 Interim Valuation
In today’s working environment, employees change their jobs more frequently than before (see
Cosandey, 2014). Often this is linked to a change of the pension fund associated with the
employer. For the fund, remediation is most important. If contributors leave, they are entitled
by law to receive their regular contributions and the minimum interest rate that has been paid.
Remediation measures are only credited to the assets At but not to the accounts and remain with
the fund. For our model, bonuses are credited to the accounts of the policyholders and therefore
remain with the insured when leaving. Exceptions may apply, though, in the case of a partial
liquidation (see, e.g., FZG, Art. 23), where bonuses could be canceled by required remediation
measures. We examine the results after 10 years (insured aged 35) and 20 years (age 45) and
compare them with the ones at retirement for the scenarios (A), (B) and (C). Numerical results
are reported in Table 4.
Valuation at Time t = 10 For cases (B) and (C) in t = 10, E [Kt] stays below CHF 1 000.
Since Ct is no more than CHF 25 000 at that time, this can be considered a low amount.
Compared to t = 40, less than 10% of E [Kt] is paid in the first ten years in case (B). Introducing
surpluses in (C) leads to a small increase of the remediation measures. Simultaneously, the ratio
of the expected sums of additional contributions in t = 10 and 40 decreases to less than 3% (0.85
vs. 32.10). The bonuses lead to a growth in the expected liabilities of more than CHF 2 000,
more than twice the amount of the remediation measures. The ratio E [Lt] /(Ct +E [Kt]) grows
and is lager than one. The same holds for u−1 (E [u (Lt)]) /(Ct + E [Kt]). The distribution
of surpluses also leads to higher remediation measures and to a higher volatility causing the
relative certainty equivalent to be almost 5% lower than E [Lt] / (Ct + E [Kt]) (1.008 vs. 1.054).
Valuation at Time t = 20 In case (B), E [Kt] exceeds CHF 2000, corresponding to an
increase by a factor of three (against 670 in t = 10). They reach approximately 30% (2.11
vs. 7.69) of the value in t = 40. Distributing surpluses increases E [Kt]. While it doubles, the
ratio of E [Kt] for t = 20 and 40 decreases to less than 15% (4.18 vs. 32.10). The distribution
of bonuses leads to the expected liabilities gaining approximately CHF 15 000. This is more
than six times larger than in time t = 10 (15 vs. 2.3). Thus, while the remediation measures
increase, the distributed bonuses increase even more. This also holds for E [Lt] / (Ct + E [Kt])
which grows by approximately 7% (1.129 vs. 1.054). In case (B), it stays at 0.974. The relative
certainty equivalent experiences a gain of more than 2% (1.032 vs. 1.008) in case (C) and is
smaller than E [Lt] / (Ct + E [Kt]).
Discussion In early years, the paid amounts remain rather low. As the salary and the con-
version factor grow over time, most of the contributions are paid towards the end of the time
frame. The required amounts in the case of underfunding remain low in early years. Con-
sequently, when changing pension funds in early years, the effect of contributors not taking
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Cases and parameters Valuation of final payoff in T and effective returns
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1 A 361.2 0 361.2 1.000 1.25
2 B 1 0.90 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.988 1.16
3 B 1 0.92 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.986 1.15
4 B 1 0.94 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.983 1.13
5 B 1 0.96 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.981 1.12
6 B 1 0.98 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.980 1.11
7 B 1 1.00 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.979 1.10
8 B 2 10.0 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.961 0.96
9 B 2 5.0 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.954 0.90
10 B 2 2.5 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.948 0.85
11 B 2 1.0 0 361.2 0 361.2 0.938 0.76
12 C 1 1.00 1 1.02 0.02 623.9 15.0 0.80 504.6 1.100 3.37
13 C 1 1.00 1 1.06 0.02 544.3 15.1 0.93 450.7 1.089 2.99
14 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.02 501.7 15.2 1.04 423.2 1.076 2.74
15 C 1 1.00 1 1.14 0.02 475.0 15.1 1.13 407.0 1.063 2.54
16 C 1 1.00 1 1.18 0.02 455.7 14.9 1.22 396.4 1.050 2.36
17 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.01 495.2 15.1 1.06 419.8 1.075 2.69
18 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.02 501.7 15.2 1.04 423.2 1.076 2.74
19 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.03 508.3 15.3 1.01 426.2 1.076 2.78
20 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.04 514.8 15.4 0.99 429.0 1.074 2.82
21 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.05 521.6 15.5 0.96 431.6 1.072 2.86
22 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.06 528.6 15.7 0.93 434.0 1.068 2.90
23 C 1 0.90 1 1.10 0.02 483.7 15.6 1.10 409.9 1.088 2.74
24 C 1 0.92 1 1.10 0.02 487.4 15.5 1.09 412.9 1.086 2.73
25 C 1 0.94 1 1.10 0.02 491.5 15.4 1.08 415.9 1.083 2.73
26 C 1 0.96 1 1.10 0.02 496.0 15.3 1.06 419.2 1.080 2.73
27 C 1 0.98 1 1.10 0.02 499.9 15.2 1.05 421.9 1.077 2.74
28 C 1 1.00 1 1.10 0.02 501.7 15.2 1.04 423.2 1.076 2.74
29 C 2 10.0 1 1.10 0.02 581.9 14.7 0.88 479.2 1.044 2.87
30 C 2 5.0 1 1.10 0.02 685.0 16.2 0.83 534.7 0.991 3.09
31 C 2 2.5 1 1.10 0.02 903.2 19.3 0.86 635.8 0.888 3.43
32 C 2 1.0 1 1.10 0.02 1 430.6 23.2 0.90 854.3 0.742 4.04
Table 3: Valuation of final payoff and effective returns in cases (A), (B) and (C) (see Section 4.1).
The parameter values are as in Table 1.
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Funding levels, bonuses and additional contributions
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1 1.17 0.84 1.14 1.57 0 25
2 1.19 0.90 1.15 1.58 0 26 1.5 0.5 6.41
3 1.19 0.90 1.15 1.58 0 26 1.8 0.8 5.01
4 1.20 0.91 1.16 1.58 0 26 2.0 1.2 3.87
5 1.20 0.92 1.16 1.58 0 27 2.3 1.8 2.93
6 1.20 0.93 1.16 1.58 0 27 2.5 2.7 2.16
7 1.20 0.93 1.16 1.58 0 27 2.6 4.0 1.52
8 1.24 0.98 1.19 1.61 0 31 4.9 6.6 1.74
9 1.26 1.00 1.21 1.62 0 33 5.8 7.4 1.84
10 1.27 1.01 1.22 1.63 0 35 6.7 8.1 1.94
11 1.29 1.03 1.24 1.65 0 36 8.0 8.9 2.11
12 0.98 0.88 1.00 1.02 10 19 31.0 15.6 4.64 73.7 18.8 9.14
13 1.01 0.90 1.03 1.05 4 15 16.8 10.9 3.60 51.4 14.7 8.14
14 1.04 0.91 1.05 1.09 1 11 10.3 7.9 3.04 39.4 11.6 7.91
15 1.07 0.91 1.07 1.12 0 9 7.0 6.2 2.64 31.9 9.4 7.92
16 1.09 0.92 1.09 1.15 0 7 5.2 5.2 2.33 26.6 7.7 8.03
17 1.05 0.91 1.06 1.09 1 12 9.4 7.4 2.94 37.6 12.6 6.96
18 1.04 0.91 1.05 1.09 1 11 10.3 7.9 3.04 39.4 11.6 7.91
19 1.04 0.90 1.05 1.09 2 11 11.2 8.3 3.13 41.3 10.8 8.94
20 1.03 0.90 1.05 1.09 2 10 12.2 8.8 3.23 43.1 10.0 10.04
21 1.03 0.90 1.04 1.09 2 9 13.2 9.3 3.33 45.0 9.4 11.20
22 1.03 0.90 1.03 1.09 3 9 14.4 9.7 3.45 47.0 8.8 12.43
23 1.03 0.87 1.04 1.09 1 10 5.0 1.0 11.21 34.4 10.3 7.78
24 1.03 0.88 1.05 1.09 1 10 6.1 1.5 9.17 35.4 10.6 7.81
25 1.04 0.89 1.05 1.09 1 11 7.3 2.3 7.37 36.6 10.9 7.84
26 1.04 0.90 1.05 1.09 1 11 8.6 3.5 5.77 37.8 11.2 7.87
27 1.04 0.90 1.05 1.09 1 11 9.8 5.2 4.33 38.9 11.5 7.90
28 1.04 0.91 1.05 1.09 1 11 10.3 7.9 3.04 39.4 11.6 7.91
29 1.06 0.94 1.07 1.09 0 17 31.2 16.8 4.34 61.9 16.7 8.67
30 1.06 0.96 1.09 1.09 0 21 57.0 37.5 3.54 90.9 20.7 10.24
31 1.07 0.98 1.11 1.11 0 26 112.7 39.0 6.74 152.3 25.4 13.96
32 1.07 1.00 1.13 1.13 0 31 249.1 39.0 14.89 301.0 30.7 22.89
Table 3: Valuation of final payoff and effective returns in cases (A), (B) and (C) (see Section 4.1).
The parameter values are as in Table 1 (continued).
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t = 10 A 23.8 0 23.8 26.3 0 26.3 1 1
B 23.8 0.61 23.8 26.3 0.67 26.3 0.975 0.975
C 23.8 0.77 25.9 26.3 0.85 28.6 1.054 1.008
t = 20 A 65.4 0 65.4 79.9 0 79.9 1 1
B 65.4 1.73 65.4 79.9 2.11 79.9 0.974 0.974
C 65.4 3.43 77.7 79.9 4.18 94.9 1.129 1.032
t = 40 A 242.1 0 242.1 361.2 0 361.2 1 1
B 242.1 5.16 242.1 361.2 7.69 361.2 0.979 0.979
C 242.1 21.52 336.3 361.2 32.10 501.7 1.276 1.076
Table 4: Simulation results for cases (A), (B) and (C) after 10, 20 and 40 years. The parameter
values are as in Table 1.
remediation measures with themselves remains fairly low. Distributing surpluses increases the
relative certainty equivalent.
4.4 Impact of Capital Market Scenarios
Focusing on case (C), we analyze capital market scenarios. We consider the reference case
and let the drift µB follow a predefined path using two scenarios. In the first one, µB equals
the reference value in the first five periods. This is followed by ten periods with high returns
of 5% (i.e. 2% increase). Subsequently, it drops to 1% for another ten periods (mimicking a
crisis and a post-crisis environment, see e.g. Europe after the 2008 financial crisis). For the last
five time points it returns to 3%. For scenario two, the course of µB is mirrored. The minimum
interest rate rPL follows µB at a ratio of rPL/µB = 1.25/3 = 41.67% with a delay of two years.
This simulates a delayed adaptation of rPL, reflecting practice, e.g., in Switzerland, where the
minimum interest rate is adapted through a political process (BVG, Art. 15)12 The paths of µB
and rPL for both scenarios are depicted in Figure 8.
Simulation Results Table 5 reports the results. Figures 9 to 11 illustrate the development
of the means of Ft, kt and bt. The periods of increased and decreased drift µB are shown as
light and dark gray areas, respectively.
Funding Ratio Ft From Figure 9(a) it can be seen that during the times of increased mar-
ket returns, the funding ratio increases sharply. From approximately 101%, it rises to more
than 105%. The decrease of µB has an immediate impact on Ft which falls below 103%. As in
the case of high returns, Ft converges quickly to this value and subsequently changes only little.
The recovery of µB to 3% at the end of the time frame also leads to the funding ratio returning
to 104%. It can be seen in Table 5 that, as in the reference case, E[Ft] equals 104%.
12In the Swiss system, a commission regularly decides about changes of rPL. For this, they take the market
conditions into account by using a rolling average of government bonds as a benchmark. We mirror this process
in our analysis by adjusting the guaranteed interest rate rPL with a delay of two years at a fixed ratio of rPL/µB .
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Figure 8: Illustration of the drift µB of the geometric Brownian motion and the minimum
interest rate rPL for scenarios 1 and 2.
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Reference case 1.04 7.9 3.04 11.6 7.91 501.7 2.74 15.2 423.2 1.076
Scenario 1 1.04 8.1 3.71 11.8 6.94 468.1 2.17 14.2 403.1 1.041
Scenario 2 1.04 8.2 2.67 11.8 9.26 549.5 3.33 16.1 450.8 1.111
Table 5: Simulation results for the reference case (C) and scenarios 1 and 2 (cf. Table 1).
For the second scenario, the development of Ft is analogous. After an increase during the first
periods, the lower drift causes the mean funding ratio to drop to approximately 102.5%. In the
subsequent periods with higher market returns, Ft rises to nearly 106%. With µB returning
to 3%, the funding ratio decreases to 104%. As in the first scenario, Ft reacts quickly to changes
in µB and stays nearly constant once the drift stabilizes. The expected value of Ft over all 40
periods is again equal to 104%. It can thus be concluded that two periods of high and low
capital market returns of similar severity and length do not influence the expected funding
ratio, regardless of how they are ordered.
Remediation Measures kt Figure 10 depicts the present values of the remediation mea-
sures payed. In the first case, kt initially stays very low, hardly exceeding CHF 200. This is
because the high returns lead to overfunding. With the subsequent drop of µB, the additional
payments escalate quickly, reaching almost CHF 2000. Towards the end of the time frame,
the curve first decreases and then rejoins the course of the reference case, settling at approxi-
mately CHF 1 500. The remediation measures for the second scenario grow regularly until the
end of period 20, exceeding CHF 500. The successive higher market returns then cause them to
halve. While µB equals 5%, the remediation measures again grow only slowly. With the drift
returning to 3%, kt increases strongly. In time T , its mean is above CHF 2 000. Comparing the
21
Pension Funding Mechanisms: Stability and Payoff
0 10 20 30 40
1.
00
1.
01
1.
02
1.
03
1.
04
1.
05
1.
06
1.
07
Time t
F
u
n
d
in
g 
ra
ti
o 
F
t
1.
00
1.
01
1.
02
1.
03
1.
04
1.
05
1.
06
1.
07
F
u
n
d
in
g 
ra
ti
o 
F
t
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Figure 9: Illustration of the means of the funding ratio Ft in scenarios 1 and 2.
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Figure 10: Illustration of the present values of the remediation measures kt in scenarios 1 and 2.
two cases through Table 5, the expected number of additional payments is almost the same,
exceeding the reference case. The expected amount that is paid is higher for the first scenario,
reaching more than CHF 3 710. The second scenario is approximately 30% lower than that
with the reference case located almost in the middle between the two cases. The reason for
the differences in E
[
kt · e
−(t−1)rf |kt > 0
]
can be found in the development of the contributor
accounts over time. When capital market returns are low at early time points, the amounts
needed to compensate are still relatively low. At later times, the required amounts are much
larger as assets At and contributions Ct are much higher.
Distributed Surpluses bt For the first scenario, the present value of the bonus payments
increases very little at the beginning, reaching approximately CHF 2 000. The low capital
market returns then cause a slight decline, which is followed by an increase similar to that at
the beginning. The recovery of µB to 3% then leads to a strong increase to about CHF 6000. For
the second case, the payments during the first 20 periods only reach approximately CHF 1 000.
The high returns in later times lead to very high mean surpluses being distributed reaching a
maximum of about CHF 7 000. The return of µB to 3% only leads to a small decrease before
the curve proceeds to grow as in the reference case.
While the expected number of bonus payments in Table 5 amounts to nearly 12 for both
scenarios, the expected distributed surpluses are a lot higher in the second scenario (CHF 9 260).
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Figure 11: Illustration of the present values of the distributed surpluses bt in scenarios 1 and 2.
The reference case has fewer time points where bonuses are being paid and an expected value
for bt that lies between the two cases.
Liabilities and Certainty Equivalent For the second scenario the expected value of the
liabilities E[L40] is higher than for the first, amounting to a difference of more than CHF 80 000.
For E [rc+b+k], there is an increase. The lower remediation measures lead to a growth of
the effective return. Both impacts together cause a strong increase of E [rc+b+k]. In the
second scenario, the effective return is 3.33%. The first case only reaches 2.17%. For the
certainty equivalent, the results are similar to the expected liabilities. While the second sce-
nario reaches about CHF 450 000, the first one only exceeds CHF 400 000. This also holds
for u−1 (E [u (L40)]) /(E [C40] +E [K40]). Here, the reference case has a value of 1.076. The first
scenario is close to this, reaching 1.041. The second one reaches 1.111. Analyzing the relative
volatility σ [L40] /E [L40], the first scenario has the lowest fluctuation, with a value of 14.2%.
While obtaining the highest effective returns, the second scenario is also coupled to a high
volatility of 16.1%.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Remediation Measures Considering the cases without (A) and with additional contribu-
tions (B), we observe an improvement of funding levels connected with their charging. While
the higher quantiles are in good funding, the 1% quantile remains below 100% if no remedi-
ation measures are charged. In case (B), we see an improvement of this subgroup. Utilizing
remediation measures thus leads to a stabilization of the fund.
Surplus Distribution With only remediation measures being charged, the funding ratio rises
above 100% in the considered reference setting. Therefore, excessive funds can be distributed,
leading to an increase in the insured’s absolute certainty equivalent. Additionally, bonuses
exceed remediation measures. However, with increasing bonuses remediation costs increase as
well, causing higher volatility in the annual payments and thus lower utility relative to the total
costs for the policyholder.
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Calibration Remediation measures lead to an improved stability of pension funds. For this
to be fully effective, an adequate assignment of all model parameters is essential. Small changes
in variables can already lead to a strong impact on the outcomes. For example, a decrease
in Fmin of only 2% in case (C) leads to an increase of kt of more than 40%.
Interim Valuation When members leave a fund, additional contributions remain with the
fund while bonuses leave with the insured. Our results show that the insured’s account is
still fairly low after 10 and 20 years. It can therefore be concluded that a change of pension
funds can be made without a large impact on the savings. This circumstance, however, changes
dramatically in later years.
Capital Market Scenarios Letting the capital market returns follow a predefined path, we
imitate periods of both very low and very high returns. The results show that, especially for
later years, additional contributions can rise substantially if a funding gap occurs. The same is
true for the distributed surpluses. The amounts that are charged or distributed can make up a
great percentage of the overall cash flows. Capital market scenarios therefore need to be taken
into account with close attention.
Risk Bearing With the worldwide trend from defined benefit (DB) plans towards defined
contribution (DC) plans, it is interesting to put our findings into this overall context. In fact,
while in DC plans the policyholders can often choose the investment strategy, they bear a large
part of the capital market risks since mostly only minimum benefits are guaranteed upfront.
Looking at changing interest rate assumptions, Godwin et al. (1996) find that funds are likely to
change their interest rate assumptions to increase their latitude concerning contractual relation-
ships. Poterba et al. (2007) find that on average the retirement wealth from DC plans exceeds
the one from DB plans. However, DC schemes are more likely to generate very low outcomes.
In a similar spirit, Vigna and Haberman (2001) analyze the financial risk in a DC pension plan
to derive an optimal investment strategy. They conclude that there is a large variability in
the level of pension achieved at retirement. Our results are in line with these findings. As the
distribution of bonuses increases the volatility of the payoff, the relative certainty equivalent of
risk averse individuals decreases.
Policy Recommendations This work analyzes the value of the accounts of the insured at
retirement. We observe that the utilized funding mechanisms and their specific calibration can
have an important impact on the stability of the fund and the utility of its contributors. In
our model, the charging of remediation measures and the distribution of surpluses takes place
automatically. In practice, decisions concerning these actions would typically be made by the
funds board. From this we conclude that the role of the board and the governance is crucial
for the management of a fund. Although our model is fitted to the Swiss pension fund system,
an interpretation of our findings in the light of the rules in place in other countries and an
extension of the results to other types of DC pension plans should be straightforward. Also, in
practice, the administration costs, the mortality of the members and the decumulation phase
where pensions are paid out should be accounted for to get more realistic results. Nevertheless,
we observe that while considering solvency constraints, distributing bonuses may increase the
risks borne by policyholders and the common belief of policyholders profiting from surplus
distribution is a fallacy. Given the current trends of the low interest rate environment and
volatility in many markets, such mechanisms should be used with caution.
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